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Price premiums are a key proﬁt driver for long-term business relationships. For sellers in business-to-
business (B2B) relationships, it is important to have appropriate strategies to negotiate price increases
without trading off the relationships with their buyers. This paper aims to understand the annual price
negotiation processes of companies by predicting whether a seller’s reservation price, target price, and
initial offer positively affect the price negotiation outcome between the sellers and buyers. Data from
284 B2B relationships of a chemicals supplier based in Germany was used to examine our research
model. In order to capture the non-linear decisions that are involved in price negotiations and to address
collinearity among negotiations’ determinants, neural network analysis was used to predict the factors
that inﬂuence price negotiation outcome. The neural network model was then compared with the results
from regression analysis. Compared to regression analysis, the neural network has a lower standard error,
and it showed that target price played a more important role in B2B price negotiations. The neural net-
work was also able measure non-linear, non-compensatory decisions that are involved in price negotia-
tions. The results imply that neural networks should be more widely used by researchers to address the
threats that multi-collinearity poses. For companies, the results imply that price targets should be
actively managed, e.g. through clear ﬁnancial aims or through seminars aiming to help sales personnel
toestablishmorechallengingnegotiationaims.1. Introduction
Price negotiations play an important role in business as their
outcomes can impact long-term business relationships’ proﬁtabil-
ity and the reputation of businesses (Carbonneau, Kersten, &
Vahidov, 2008). B2B price negotiations have various challenges
such as the complex business environment which usually involves
multiple interactions by at least two – and often many – people
(Plank, 1997), and are therefore more complex than consumer
price studies (Carbonneau et al., 2008; Holden & Burton, 2008; Ko-
tler & Keller, 2006). Companies understandably also very rarely
make their B2B pricing transparent or accessible due to its direct
competitive proﬁt relevance and often strategic character. For sales
personnel who are preparing for annual price negotiations, it is dif-
ﬁcult to knowwhat price to demand (initial offer), what settlement
to actually expect (target price), and what minimum price can be
accepted before the relationship becomes unproﬁtable (reserva-
tion price). Price references (Mazumdar, Raj, & Sinha, 2005) inﬂu-
ence the negotiation behavior of both sellers and buyers and
ultimately the price negotiation outcome..Yee-Loong Chong). 1
Several conclusions can be drawn from existing studies of pric-
ing negotiations, e.g. by Moosmayer, Schuppar, and Siems (2012)
and Van Poucke and Buelens (2002). Firstly, existing studies in
price negotiations are overly experimental (Krause, Terpend, & Pet-
ersen, 2006), often using student samples, and transactional in nat-
ure. However, ﬁndings based on experimental designs account
neither for context factors such as negotiators’ expertise and expe-
rience, nor for the fact that the nature of industrial business is pre-
dominantly relationship-based, rather than transactional. The
validity of experimental, transaction-oriented ﬁndings for price
negotiations in B2B relationships thus appears questionable. More-
over, studies based on student sampling, although strong in inter-
nal validity (Bachrach & Bendoly, 2011; Eckerd & Bendoly, 2011),
may suggest inappropriate business decisions due to limited exter-
nal validity (Ketchen & Hult, 2011; Stevens, 2011). Secondly, linear
regression models are often chosen to examine the relationships
between the determinants of price negotiations and their out-
comes. However, regression models are preference regressions
which assume that price negotiation decisions are linear compen-
satory models (Chong, 2013). Under this assumption, the shortfall
in a negotiations decision such as reservation price can be compen-
sated for by other factors such as initial offers or target price. How-
ever, given the complexities involved in price negotiations, linear
regression models may not be able to capture all the non-compen-
satory decision rules involved in these processes, and as a result
such models are deemed unreliable. Studies in other disciplines
such as information systems have found that linear models tend
to oversimplify the complexities involved in decisions (Chong,
2013; Venkatesh & Goyal, 2010). Thirdly, a limitation of regression
models is the assumption of independent determinants; however,
the seller’s price preferences in negotiations are often interdepen-
dent. This may result in high multi-collinearity in the data analysis
thus affecting the reliability of the results.
This research has several objectives. Firstly, this study aims to
understand the factors that can predict the price negotiation out-
comes in B2B relationships. Variables such as a seller’s reservation
price, target price, and initial offer are examined to see if they pre-
dict price negotiation outcome. Secondly, this research aims to
examine whether non-linear, non-compensatory decision models
such as neural networks provide a better model ﬁt and forecasting
than linear regression models for predicting pricing negotiation
outcomes. In order to achieve this, the results from the neural net-
work will be compared with regression analysis. Lastly, based on
the results, this research will suggest how companies can maintain
proﬁtable long term B2B relationships by managing sales person-
nel’s trust in pricing negotiations, and how researchers can use
neural networks to help address multi-collinearity issues.2. Previous research
2.1. Negotiations in a business-to-business context
A deﬁning characteristic of negotiations is that parties with
opposing interests make a joint business decision, regularly direc-
ted to the purchase of a certain amount of a speciﬁc product or ser-
vice at a speciﬁc price. Negotiations may be understood as
processes that ‘‘bring two or more parties together to try to accom-
plish mutually beneﬁcial outcomes, while meeting individual goals
that may be at odds with the other negotiating parties’ goals’’
(Swaidan, 2007: 163). More competitively, negotiations may be
understood as ‘‘a process of potentially opportunistic interaction
by which two or more parties, with some apparent conﬂict, seek
to do better through jointly decided action than they could other-
wise’’ (Lax & Sebenius, 1986: 11). Prior research has primarily ta-
ken economic (Nash, 1950; Nash, 1953; Tversky & Kahneman,
1991) and psychological (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Brenner, Koehler,
Liberman, & Tversky, 1996; Oliver, Balakrishnan, & Barry, 1994;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) perspectives.
The economic perspective on negotiations has been presented
by Nash (1950). He assumed distributive bargaining conditions
with each party aiming to maximize its own proﬁt (Pruitt, 1983)
and both parties knowing the preferences of the negotiation part-
ner. In this context, Nash argued, negotiators who behave ratio-
nally would thus share the gains of negotiation equally and agree
on the mid-point between the buyer’s and seller’s reservation
prices as a price negotiation outcome; the so-called ‘‘Nash equilib-
rium’’. A further focus has thus been the determination of a party’s
reservation price. Empirically, some studies found support for the
Nash equilibrium (White, Valley, Bazerman, Neale, & Peck, 1994),
but other research efforts did not (Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Neale
& Bazerman, 1992). Furthermore, one might think that more indi-
vidual aspects like personal ambition are neglected in these eco-
nomic perspectives. Such aspects have been discussed in the
psychological stream.
A particular focus in this context has been on the establishment
of cognitive references and their application when evaluating an
offer. Cost (Wilken, Cornelissen, Backhaus, & Schmitz, 2010), the
best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) (Fisher & 2Ury, 1981) as best sourcing alternative (Wang & Zionts, 2008),
and market price (Blount White, Thomas-Hunt, & Neale, 1996;
Kristensen & Gaerling, 1997b; White et al., 1994) have been dis-
cussed as important references in price negotiations. For market
price, empirical results are contradictory with some authors
describing a signiﬁcant impact on price negotiation outcome
(Blount White et al., 1996) and others showing no inﬂuence (White
et al., 1994). Moreover, it has been shown that negotiators –
although contradicting the assumption of rational behavior – are
inﬂuenced by past experiences (e.g. prices paid in the past) as a ref-
erence (Diekmann, Tenbrunsel, Shah, Schroth, & Bazerman, 1996).
In this paper, we aim to use a seller’s references in order to ex-
plain B2B price negotiation outcome, i.e. the settlement price
reached in price negotiations in continuous B2B relationships. Price
negotiation outcome thus describes a percentage price increase
compared to the previous year’s price level ﬁxed in a framework
agreement. As references of the counterparty are usually inaccessi-
ble to a negotiator, we focus on only one negotiator’s reference
points. We focus on the seller side and accordingly we do not con-
sider buyer’s references in our model.
A broad range of reference points and their framing have been
found to be relevant with regard to price negotiation outcomes
(Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985; Nagel & Mills, 1989). We
investigate the negotiation of price changes in annual reviews of
B2B relationships. In this context, we focus on negotiators’ reserva-
tion price, target price, and initial offer. We do so because these
have been the focus of prior experimental research (Krause et al.,
2006; Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002). Moreover, their managerial
relevance is high because these ‘‘reference points . . . are deter-
mined before the negotiation’’ (Krause et al., 2006: 13) and manag-
ers could thus manipulate them in order to achieve better
negotiation results. Finally, other references that have been dis-
cussed in the literature appear not to be relevant or inherent to
the context: in the negotiations that were studied, sellers ap-
proached buyers with an initial offer; considering the intended ini-
tial offer as a distinct determinant as in Miles (2010) is thus not
necessary. Similarly, past prices as discussed in Diekmann et al.
(1996) are the basis to which negotiated price changes are applied
and are thus reﬂected in each reference.2.2. References in price research
The reference concept has been established in the psychological
domain (Helson, 1964; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and has been
successfully applied to pricing issues (Mazumdar et al., 2005;
Winer, 1986). Reference prices are individual price norms that
are applied when judging a price observed in the market (Winer,
1988). Such references may have a predictive and normative func-
tion (Rajendran & Tellis, 1994). The application of reference price
theory has focused on the explanation of consumer brand choice
and on the opportunity to guide consumer price perceptions dur-
ing and after their purchases. Reference prices are commonly dif-
ferentiated by their sources being internal (in other words based
on memories of prior experiences or derived from the mind) or
external (perceived in the decision-making situation, e.g. when
shopping in a supermarket) (Mazumdar et al., 2005). The reference
price concept has also been applied in B2B marketing (Moosmayer
et al., 2012; Wilken et al., 2010) and beyond the marketing domain,
such as in human resource management (Siems, Goelzner, & Moos-
mayer, 2012) and in accounting (Mitter C. & F., 2008). Conceptu-
ally, reference prices reﬂect expectations of acceptable
adaptation levels (Monroe, 1973), normative considerations
regarding fairness (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003), aspiration per-
spectives (Klein & Oglethorpe, 1987), and aspects of social context
(Mezias, Chen, & Murphy, 2002).
In this investigation we consider the reservation price, that is,
the lowest price at which a seller is willing to close a deal.
Although it is a reference internal to the seller, the reservation
price is still overly determined by aspects beyond the control of
the negotiator, such as the company’s cost base or the BATNA.
The impact of reservation price on price negotiation outcome can
be explained by range theory (Volkmann, 1951). Along with range
theory, price stimuli are judged against their position within a
range of acceptable prices. Reservation price constitutes the bot-
tom of such a range. Some studies have found reservation prices
to be an important determinant of the price negotiation outcome
(Kristensen & Gaerling, 1997a; White et al., 1994).
Target prices represent negotiators’ price targets and thus con-
stitute the best settlement a buyer or a seller can expect to achieve
(Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002). As such it constitutes an internal ref-
erence. The seller will judge any counter offer by the buyer primar-
ily against this target. Kristensen and Gaerling (1997a) proposed
that one party’s target price reﬂects the estimate of the other
party’s reservation price. That is, a seller’s target price would re-
ﬂect the estimated maximum willingness to pay of the buying
counterpart. Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests
that any price obtained below the reference is perceived as a loss,
while prices obtained above it are perceived as gains. Also, losses
are systematically overweighted (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Fin-
kenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). Therefore,
any price below the references should cause dissatisfaction and in-
voke determined seller efforts to reach a price closer to the refer-
ence. In contrast, prices above the negotiator’s own references
are perceived as gains that do not merit aggressive tactics. Conse-
quently, higher target prices may be expected to result in higher
price negotiation outcomes. This is in line with research which
has shown that negotiators with more ambitious goals, i.e. higher
target prices, reach higher price negotiation outcomes (Huber &
Neale, 1986; Huber & Neale, 1987; Lim, 1997; Pruitt, 1981; White
& Neale, 1994).
Initial offers (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Raiffa, 1982) consti-
tute references that may be used as a strategic informational cue
given by the seller to the buyer. As the ﬁrst price point, initial offers
constitute an important element of negotiation and bargaining
processes. Initial offers are determined by sellers before the nego-
tiation begins (Krause et al., 2006). Research investigated initial of-
fers as a trigger for a series of counter offers. The initial offer can be
understood as a price anchor against which both parties adjust
their own price references (Kahneman, 1992) and subsequently
their counter offers. Accordingly, initial offers are very important
for the outcome of competitive bargaining processes. For buyers,
the initial offer is the ﬁrst reference that requires a response.
Hence, initial offers function as ‘‘anchors’’ or external references
for the buyer. As strategic informational cues, initial offers affect
the corresponding counter offer because they provide the person
making the counter offer with additional information with which
to reassess his or her intended offer (Kristensen & Gaerling,
1997c; Liebert, Smith, Hill, & Keiffer, 1968). Adoption level theory
has been used to argue that this reference is perceived as a strong
adoption level by the buyer whose counter offer must respond to
this adoption level. For maintaining the negotiation, buyers are
likely to provide a response, i.e. a counter offer, to which the nego-
tiation partner can be expected to respond positively. In other
words, higher initial offers raise the subsequent offers. Evidence
shows that the stated ﬁrst offer can affect the corresponding coun-
ter offer (Kristensen & Gaerling, 1997c; Yukl, 1974) and ultimately
the negotiation outcome (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Some research
has even claimed initial offers to be the best predictors of price
negotiation outcomes (Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002).
As the extent to which a negotiator is able to translate his or her
references into price negotiation outcomes might depend on the 3speciﬁc relationship context, particularly how proﬁtable the rela-
tionship is (proﬁtability of relationship) and how much business
the company does with each buyer (size of relationship) (e.g.
McHugh, Humphreys, & McIvor, 2003 on power relationships),
we consider these two inﬂuences as control variables and aim to
evaluate the resulting model:
Model : PNO ¼ b0 þ bRPR þ bTPT þ bIPI þ bC1PC1 þ bC2PC2 þ e
with
PNO = Price negotiation outcome
PR = Seller’s reservation price
PT = Seller’s target price
PI = Seller’s initial offer
PC[1] = Control 1: proﬁtability of relationship
PC[2] = Control 2: size of relationship
bX = Importance coefﬁcients for determinant X
e = Error term
It is worth noting that the three price references that are con-
sidered might not be independent. Some authors have argued for
conceptual interdependence between initial offer and target price
(Kristensen & Gaerling, 1997b). The direction of this inﬂuence is
disputed, with some authors suggesting target price affects (Krause
et al., 2006), and others suggesting it is affected by, the initial offer
(Kristensen & Gaerling, 1997b). Others have empirically identiﬁed
substantial collinearity between all three references (Van Poucke &
Buelens, 2002).
Two approaches have been suggested to address this interde-
pendence and the resulting multicollinearity in the context of price
negotiations. One is to consider a single price reference and to use
two additional, compound determinants, namely, the target zone
(Blount White, Valley, Bazerman, Neale, & Peck, 1994), which de-
scribes the difference between reservation and target price, and
the offer zone (Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002), which describes the
difference between target price and initial offer. Analyzing dyadic
data from 183 experimental negotiations with experienced negoti-
ators in a ﬁctitious context, Van Poucke and Buelens (2002) use ini-
tial offer as the most important reference and add the two zones to
overcome multicollinearity. Nevertheless, this approach automati-
cally attributes all ‘‘shared’’ variance to the one original price refer-
ence that is kept (here the initial offer). The approach thus does not
help to clarify which determinant is actually most important but
applies some untested assumptions. An alternative approach was
presented by Moosmayer et al. (2012), addressing the multicollin-
earity issue in the price negotiation data with ridge regression.
Ridge regression adds a constant term to the variables and thereby
reduces standard errors at the expense of systematically biased
estimates. In this analysis they found initial price offering and re-
duced target price to be of approximately equal weight. Through
ridge regression they obtained statistically signiﬁcant results; nev-
ertheless, the impact of the included bias remained unclear.
To overcome the threat of potential multicollinearity, we aim to
evaluate our model not only with regression analysis but also with
neural networks. Multicollinearity seemed to occur because the
price references appear to have some kind of shared ﬂoor. Because
this ﬂoor is shared, it cannot be attributed to one of the price ref-
erences. However, regression analysis does not allow accounting
for such shared variance and is thus likely to misallocate this
shared variance. Neural networks, in contrast, are not sensitive to
multicollinearity, because they integrate a hidden layer between
independent and dependent variables. Although neural networks
do not allow any assumptions about the hidden layer, one might
imagine that the variance shared by all three price determinants
is accounted for in the hidden layer. Neural networks thus implic-
itly account for multicollinearity in the data and should make it
possible to attribute more accurate importance weights to the
three references. Statistically, neural network analysis thus consti-
tutes an effective means to overcome the threat that multicolline-
arity poses to the application of regression analyses.
2.3. Neural network overview
A neural network (or artiﬁcial neural network) is a ‘‘massively
parallel distributed processor made up of simple processing units,
which have a natural propensity for storing experimental knowl-
edge and making it available for use’’ (Haykin, 2001). A neural net-
work is inspired by the way the human brain structured and how it
acquires knowledge from its environment through a learning pro-
cess (Tsai & Wu, 2008). The knowledge acquired in a neural net-
work input is stored by the interneuron connection strengths
(Haykin, 2001). Despite being inspired by the function of the hu-
man neurological systems, the architectures as well as the process-
ing elements in neural networks have gone beyond their biological
inspirations (Chong, 2013; Svozil, Kvasnicka, & Pospichal, 1997). A
neural network is simply a statistical method which can be used to
obtain a close approximation to a problem based on a particular
observation (Sexton, Johnson, & Hignite, 2002). Using historical
data, a neural network is able to apply the learning process to mod-
ify its interneuron connection strengths (or weight coefﬁcients) in
an orderly manner to achieve the desired design objective (Sexton
et al., 2002).
Neural network models are typically comprised of nodes or
neurons that are ordered into hierarchical layers (see Fig. 1). The
ﬁrst layer is known as the input layer, the last layer is called the
output layer, and the layers in between are called hidden layers
(Chong, 2013). Data is received by the input layers, and the infor-
mation and conclusions are produced in the output layers (Morris,
Greer, Hughes, & Clark, 2004). The neurons in each layer are con-
nected to neurons in the following layer. Synaptic weights are gi-
ven to each input (Bakar & Tahir, 2009). These weights are
transferred to the subsequent hidden layers which have several
hidden neurons. The values in the hidden layer are then added
through applied weights, and they are converted into an output va-
lue by a nonlinear activation function (see Svozil et al., 1997 for
more details on activation functions). The weights obtained are
passed to the neurons in the next layer, and provide a feed-forward
path to the output layer (Sexton et al., 2002). The weight coefﬁ-
cients are adjusted through an iterative training process when
the training samples are used to train the network. The weight
coefﬁcients show the degree of importance of a given connection
in a neural network, (Svozil et al., 1997), and the trained knowl-
edge is then stored for future predictive use.
Neural networks have several advantages when compared to
the traditional linear statistical methods. A neuron is a non-linear
device, and as a result, the neural network itself is non-linear.
The non-linearity in neural networks is important as it allows for
the investigation of relationships between inputs and outputs
which are non-linear, e.g. in studying of non-compensatory deci-Fig. 1. Three layer network. 4sion processes (Svozil et al., 1997). Another advantage of the neural
network is that its input and output mapping can be accomplished
without meeting the assumptions of sample distribution which are
often required in linear regression studies (Chiang, Zhang, & Zhou,
2006; Garson, 1998). Neural networks are also found to have better
prediction rates when compared to traditional compensatory mod-
els such as logistic, multiple, and discriminant regression analyses
(Chiang et al., 2006; Garson, 1998). A neural network is also capa-
ble of adapting without much assistance from users.
Neural networks have been applied to various studies in eco-
nomics (Kaastra & Boyd, 1996), consumer choice (Chiang et al.,
2006; Hu, Shanker, & Hung, 1999), and customer loyalty (Hsu, Shih,
Huang, Lin, & Lin, 2009) and information systems adoptions
(Chong, 2013). These studies showed that neural networks can
be applied to broad areas of research, consistently providing good
results. This study therefore employs a neural network to predict
the factors that inﬂuence price negotiation outcomes in B2B rela-
tionships. The results from the neural network will then be com-
pared to those obtained from multiple regression analysis in
order to determine which approach offers better predictive power.3. Methodology
3.1. Approach
In order to test the model we collected data on the European
B2B sales activities of a global player in the chemical industry
based in Germany. We chose the chemical industry due to its eco-
nomic relevance and because it sells to clients in a diverse ﬁeld of
industries. In line with the recommendation to use the most qual-
iﬁed informants for gathering information on an issue under inves-
tigation (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993), we invited the
negotiating sales staff of the company to be our key informants.
To reduce individual inﬂuences and to increase motivation to par-
ticipate, all negotiators received sales training before starting the
negotiation. The trained personnel conducted 645 negotiations
and returned complete data for 284 negotiations, resulting in a
44% response rate. Considering managers’ daily pressures and the
conﬁdentiality of the issue, this seems to be a satisfactory response
rate. Moreover, the missing data was not correlated with other var-
iable values in these observations and did thus not cause any sys-
tematic bias. Although the researchers have no precise information
about non-successful negotiations, experiences with B2B supplier
relationships in general and with this chemical supplier company
in particular establish that non-closure is not a major issue.
3.2. Data
For each relationship we investigated, we collected the sellers’
reservation price, target price and initial offer before the negotia-
tion started. The price negotiation outcome was collected after
the negotiation (see Table 1 for means and correlations). All these
variables are manifest single item measures and describe relative
price increases. For instance, a price negotiation outcome of .07
represents a 7 % price increase compared to the existing frame-
work agreement. Proﬁtability and size of relationship were used
as controls: both were provided by the negotiators. Proﬁtability
was measured as percentage portion of total revenue, i.e. 16 repre-
sents a 16 % gross margin. Size of relationship was measured in to-
tal revenue in Euros.
3.3. Multiple regression analysis
We performed multiple regression analysis to determine how
the different price references inﬂuence the eventual price
Table 1
Means, standard deviations and correlations of measured price references.
Mean Std Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Reservation price 0.055 0.064
(2) Target price 0.075 0.081 0.911⁄⁄⁄ 0
(3) Initial offer 0.097 0.097 0.888⁄⁄⁄ 0.968⁄⁄⁄
(4) Price negotiation outcome 0.073 0.076 0.861⁄⁄⁄ 0.925⁄⁄⁄ 0.912⁄⁄⁄
(5) Sizea 0.336 0.629 0.110 0.115 0.112 0.131⁄
(6) Proﬁtability 0.423 0.224 0.389⁄⁄⁄ 0.407⁄⁄⁄ 0.407⁄⁄⁄ 0.388⁄⁄⁄ 0.005
Note: STD: standard deviation.
a Measured in 1000,000 euro.
Table 2
Regression model with price references.
Regression model
S.E. of Estimate = 0.0284
R2 = 0.863; Ra2 = 0.860
B SE b VIF
Constant 0.009 0.005
Reservation price 0.117 0.064 0.098n.s. 16.0
Target price 0.548 0.093 0.583⁄⁄⁄ 19.9
Initial offering .199 0.070 0.254⁄⁄ 5.91
Sizea 0.003 0.003 0.025n.s. 1.02
Proﬁtability 0.003 0.008 0.009n.s. 1.21
a Measured in 1000,000 euro.negotiation outcomes (see Table 2). To support the assumed linear
relationship, each price reference was plotted against the price
negotiation outcome without any non-linear relationship being
identiﬁed. No auto-correlation was found based on Durbin–Wat-
son scores. Heteroscedasticity was analyzed, based on plots of
the residuals and no particularities were identiﬁed.
R2 and adjusted R2 are both .86, i.e. the following model ex-
plained 86% of the variation in price negotiation outcomes reached
by the negotiators of the chemical company in their dealings:
PS ¼ :009þ :117PR þ :548PT þ :199PI  :003PC1  :003PC2 þ e
Target price has the highest regression weight (B = 0.55) and thus
appears to be the most important determinant; initial offer is less
important (B = 0.20), while the inﬂuence of reservation price
(B = 0.12) remains insigniﬁcant (t = 1.82). The limited signiﬁcance
of the result seems to be caused by relatively high standard errors,
which can be traced back to substantial multi-collinearity in the
data and resulting VIF scores as high as 19.9. This is in line with
the expectations of a shared basis (Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002).
Hence, in order to overcome the threat that is imposed by multi-Table 3
RMSE for the neural networks.
RMSE from NN training sample RMSE from NN
Neural network 1 0.0281 0.0233
Neural network 2 0.0281 0.0247
Neural network 3 0.0279 0.0248
Neural network 4 0.0281 0.0238
Neural network 5 0.0281 0.0230
Neural network 6 0.0280 0.0243
Neural network 7 0.0280 0.0243
Neural network 8 0.0281 0.0251
Neural network 9 0.0278 0.0246
Neural network 10 0.0280 0.0243
NN 1-10 Average 0.0280 0.0242
a Based on a comparison of the NN testing sample with the regression5collinearity, we use neural network analysis as a non-compensatory
approach to attributing importance to the determinants under
consideration.3.4. Neural network analysis
In order to examine the proposed model, a multilayer percep-
tron training algorithmwas used to train the neural network. Cross
validations were applied to prevent the model from overﬁtting. As
indicated by previous studies by Sexton et al. (2002), Chong (2013)
and Svozil et al. (1997), there is no heuristic for determining the
hidden nodes in a neural network, and therefore a preliminary net-
work was examined using 1–10 hidden nodes. This approach is
consistent with previous work conducted by Chong (2013), Sexton
et al. (2002), Morris et al. (2004) and Wang and Elhag (2007). The
accuracy of the model was measured using the Root Mean Square
Error (RMSE) over ten validations. Networks with four hidden
nodes were found to be complex enough to map the datasets with-
out incurring additional errors to the neural network model. The
input layer consisted of the ﬁve price negotiation outcome predic-
tors and the output layer consisted of one output variable which
was the price negotiation outcome.
A ten-fold cross validation was performed whereby 90% of the
data was used as the training net, while the remaining 10% was
used to measure the prediction accuracy of the trained network.
Table 3 shows the RMSE for the neural network.
When compared with the regression model, applying neural
networks resulted in lower, i.e. better, RMSE values. The decrease
in RMSE ranged between 11.4% and 18.4% and averaged 14.1%. This
shows that the non-linear neural network model is able to produce
a better ﬁt and forecast of the data when compared to the regres-
sion analysis. More importantly, the result demonstrates that a
neural network model can capture the complex non-linear inte-
grating effects in price negotiation decisions.testing sample RMSE improvement of neural network compared
to regression modela
Total %
0.0050 17.8
0.0036 12.8
0.0035 12.5
0.0045 16.0
0.0053 18.8
0.0040 14.3
0.0041 14.4
0.0032 11.4
0.0038 13.3
0.0040 14.2
0.0041 14.5
(RMSE = 0.0284).
Table 4
Relevant inputs to neural network model.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Target price X X X X X X X X X X
Initial offering X X X X X X X X X X
Reservation Price X X X X X X X X X X
Size X X X X X X X X X
Proﬁtability
Table 5
Sensitivity analysis.
Variable Relative importance
Target price 1
Initial offering 0.2421
Reservation price 0.0283
Size 0.0011
Proﬁtability 0Table 4 shows how often a speciﬁc predictor was included in
the model for the ten different networks. For each input variable,
an X in the table shows that there is at least one non-zero weight
connecting it to a hidden node, thus implying that the predictor is
relevant in predicting the price negotiation outcomes. Sensitivity
analysis performance is shown in Table 4.
The neural network is able to predict relationships between res-
ervation price, target price, initial offer, proﬁtability and size of
relationship and price negotiation outcome. Based on the neural
network analyses, target price is the most signiﬁcant predictor of
price preference, followed by initial offer, reservation price and
size of relationship (see Table 5).
4. Discussion
We investigated negotiation outcomes in continuous B2B-rela-
tionships in the chemical industry and focused on the seller per-
spective. We found that 86 % of the variation in price negotiation
outcome was explained by the three price references considered:
reservation price, target price and initial offer. This remarkably high
explanatory power, together with the high correlations between all
three price references and also the price negotiation outcome sug-
gests two possible explanations. One is that industrial sellers have a
very good sense of what to expect and thus adjust their references.
Alternatively, one might assume that sellers, being the ones pre-
senting the need for a price increase, are in a strong position and
have a greater chance of achieving their internal expectations. Thus,
the results suggest that experimental research designs underesti-
mate the predictive power of a seller’s target price, as experimental
respondents are usually unfamiliar with the speciﬁc negotiation
context and will thus start with an unrealistically large variance
in their price references. This is in line with Hokey, LaTour, and
Jones (1995)’s suggestion that product experience and involvement
increase the predictive power of a negotiator’s references.
With regard to the impact of each reference on price negotiation
outcome, we have shown that a seller’s target price is the best pre-
dictor of price negotiation outcomes. This is in contrast to prior
experimental research that emphasized the importance of the ini-
tial offer, and economic research that recognized the importance of
the reservation price to predicting negotiation outcome. We sug-
gest that the lack of context in experimental research may have
caused misleading results in earlier investigations, for example
when two participants in an experiment negotiated on a product
or service with which they lacked familiarity. A lack of strong inter-
nal references and a lack of conﬁdence in the own target might
thus have resulted in the overvaluation of the importance of the 6initial offer as anchor for the entire negotiation. Such bias was fur-
ther emphasized by the transactional character of experiments.
Accordingly, we have added to existing literature by analyzing real
B2B negotiation data and ﬁnding that negotiators’ target price is
the most important predictor of B2B price negotiation outcome.
Applying a neural network method further allowed us to ad-
dress multi-collinearity in a way that has not been explored previ-
ously. Prior approaches either applied compound zone measures
that overestimated the importance of the arbitrarily chosen core
reference, or used ridge regression which produces more signiﬁ-
cant results at the expense of systematically biased ﬁndings. In
contrast to these inadequate approaches to dealing with multi-col-
linearity, neural networks constitute an approach that allowed us
to account for non-linear and non-compensatory effects in the data
and to produce important measures for each of the predictors that
do not suffer from the invalidity threat of some of the suggested
approaches to address collinearity in regression models.5. Conclusions and Implications
This research examined the predictors of B2B price negotiation
outcomes. Variables such as reservation price, target price, initial
offering, proﬁtability and size of relationship were examined in
our proposed model. Using the predictive analytic approach pro-
vided by a neural network, this research examined B2B negotia-
tions of a major chemical ﬁrm in Germany and its buyers. The
results obtained from the neural network were then compared
with multiple regression analysis. The neural network was able
to solve the multi-collinearity bias as well as to provide better pre-
dictions than the regression model. This research has several
implications.
Firstly, for companies, the results imply that it would be wise to
support their sales personnel in setting ambitious targets and
translating these into a speciﬁc target price for each negotiation.
Concretely, companies could communicate an average target price,
or a price target for each customer. Furthermore, training could
explicitly aim to enable negotiators to establish ambitious price
targets and to defend them in a negotiation. Wilken et al. (2010)
have found that providing transparent cost information to negoti-
ators can lead to more favorable outcomes for the company. It
might similarly be effective for a company to convey a better
understanding to its negotiators of how potential price negotiation
outcomes are connected to the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance. For
the individual sales representative, results generally suggest that
expecting a little more might also result in a little more. In partic-
ular, this requires solid preparation with a clear target to be
achieved.
Secondly, the results explained variation in price negotiation
outcome better that existing experimental research. Thus, relying
on experimental data that overemphasizes the importance of the
initial offer appears to be misleading. Using market data from busi-
ness negotiations seems crucial for avoiding poor managerial deci-
sions based on overly biased ﬁndings.
Thirdly, this research showed that neural networks can be used
as a means to overcome multicollinearity issues in data. In price
negotiation studies where the predictors could be highly corre-
lated, neural network analysis allows us to predict the outcomes
with less error. Our research thus suggests that neural network
method may be applied to broader range of business research
problems where multicollinearity may be an issue.6. Limitations
There are several limitations in this study. Firstly, as price nego-
tiation studies have often been conducted using experimental
approaches, it may be useful to integrate experimental data with
data collected from actual negotiations to study the predictors of
B2B negotiations. Secondly, other variables such as individual char-
acteristics (e.g. gender or personal ambition) and collective charac-
teristics (e.g. team size or cultural and national context) can be
included to improve the research model. Finally, we expect that a
dyadic approach with an analysis of both parties’ (e.g. buyers and
sellers) references may reveal some new insights.
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